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IS MAKING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
THROUGH CERTIFIED QUESTIONS A GOOD
IDEA OR A BAD IDEA?
Honorable Randall T. Shepard*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Early in the current renaissance of state constitutional law, state
court judges sometimes lamented the lack of opportunities to develop
the jurisprudence and expressed eagerness for more chances to do so.
Such invitations inevitably led litigants to plead the state constitution
more frequently, both in cases initially filed in state court and in cases
docketed in federal courts.
Federal judges hearing cases that contained a state constitutional
claim would necessarily regard themselves less well positioned to decide
such issues than would be the case if they were, for example, construing
a state statute. Federal judges have thus sometimes found it suitable to
certify questions of state constitutional law to state supreme courts, for
whom the certifications have presented additional opportunities for state
judges to expound on issues that might not otherwise arise in the course
of litigation initially brought in state court.
There are a good number of reasons why these opportunities are
problematic, including the confining manner in which certified questions
are litigated, the general need for judicial restraint in "playing the
constitutional card," and unanswered questions regarding the
precedential value of such decisions. In this article, I highlight examples
of developing state constitutional law, examine the reasons for federal
courts to certify questions of state constitutional law, and discuss the
impact that certification has on state constitutional jurisprudence.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

The work of state judges in developing the jurisprudence of the
several state constitutions, of course, predates the existence of the United

* Chief Justice of Indiana. Princeton University, A.B., 1969; Yale Law School, J.D., 1972;
University of Virginia, LL.M., 1995.
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States Constitution.1 For most of our national history, it was a central
part of what state judges did.
When the Warren Court embarked on an expansion of rights
recognized under the federal constitution, however, little room remained
for further state constitutional development. When a succession of
Republican judicial appointments brought the Warren/Brennan
revolution to a close, those seeking expansion of individual rights sought
other opportunities. In a 1975 dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan
strongly encouraged state judges to employ their own state constitutions
to vindicate rights not recognized under federal authority. 2 Many state
judges heeded the call, and the number of litigants pleading state
3
constitutional claims notably increased.
The proliferation of state constitutional litigation has altered the
legal landscape in two significant ways. First, state judges have
distinguished the application of state provisions from their federal
counterparts.4 Second, state judges have advanced the development of
unique state constitutional provisions.
Both developments have
contributed to the movement, which is now referred to as judicial
federalism.
Nearly from the beginning of this movement, there have been both
opportunities and risks. In an early and influential opinion of the
judicial federalism movement, Justice Thomas Hayes of the Vermont
Supreme Court counseled:
The development of state constitutional jurisprudence
will call for the exercise of great judicial responsibility as
well as diligence from the trial bar. It would be a serious
mistake for this Court to use its state constitution chiefly
to evade the impact of the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. Our decisions must be principled, not
5
result-oriented.

See, e.g., Washburn v. Fourth Parish of W. Springfield, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) 32 (1804);
Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113 (1804).
2
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3
See New Jersey v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
4
United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993).
5
Vermont v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 235 (Vt. 1985).
I
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He urged litigants to make the traditional constitutional arguments
for state provisions as they would for the federal constitution including
historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical
arguments. 6 Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court offered
the following guidance:
My own view has long been that a state court
always is responsible for the law of its state before
deciding whether the state falls short of a national
standard, so that no federal issue is properly reached
when the state's law protects the claimed right.... I
think most courts would take that approach for granted
when a state statute rather than a state constitution is
involved. Of course we pay attention and respect to
Supreme Court opinions on issues common to the two
constitutions, and it is to be expected that on many such
issues courts will reach common answers. The crucial
step for counsel and for state courts, however, is to
recognize that the Supreme Court's answer is not
presumptively the right answer, to be followed unless
the state court explains why not.
The right question is not whether a state's guarantee
is the same as or broader than its federal counterpart as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. The right question is
what the state's guarantee means and how it applies to
7
the case at hand.
The Indiana Supreme Court's approach to evaluating state constitutional
claims has reflected this same view.
The Indiana Constitution has unique vitality, even
where its words parallel federal language. We resolve
Indiana constitutional claims by "examining the
language of the text in the context of the history
surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose

6
Id. at 236-37 (citing P. BoBBiTF, CONSTIUTIONAL FATE-THEORY OF THE CONSTIrruTiON
25 (1982)).
7
Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus- ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165,
178-79 (1984); see also Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing
Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State ConstitutionalRights Adjudication, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015 (1997).
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We have taken this view even when the state and federal provisions
contain the same words, as is the case with search and seizure. In Brown
v. Indiana,9 the court most succinctly stated the difference between a
claim of unreasonable search and seizure brought under the Fourth
Amendment and one brought under the Indiana Bill of Rights.
Protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures is one of the most essential constitutional rights.
It holds a central place in both federal and state
constitutional criminal procedure. A violation of the
federal right occurs when a criminal trial court, over an
appropriate objection by the defendant, admits evidence
obtained in a search that neither possesses judicial
sanction nor falls into one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement. A similar violation of the state
right occurs when evidence is admitted that the State has
obtained by means of an unreasonable search. 10
When applying the Indiana Constitution search and seizure
provision, our supreme court looked to historical context, the text of the
provision, and analogous cases." While modest differences in text
provide an argument for attorneys attempting to enlarge the protections
of a particular provision and another reason for state judges to
distinguish themselves from federal jurisprudence, this distinction
should have little impact on the state court's willingness or ability to
further its own state constitutional jurisprudence. As Justice Linde
wrote:
Some state courts make too much of identity or
slight differences between the texts of similar
constitutional clauses. The first step is to overcome the
sense that divergence from Supreme Court doctrines is
more legitimate when the state's text differs from its
federal counterpart than when they are the same. In

Indiana v. Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Ind. Gaming Comm'n
v. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Ind. 1994)).
9
653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 1995).
10 Id. at 79 (footnotes omitted).
11 Moran v. Indiana, 644 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. 1994).

8
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truth the state court is equally responsible for reaching
its own conclusion in either case. A textual difference
only makes this easier to see. It may alert courts and
counsel to look past familiar caselaw and actually to
read the state's text, on the assumption that those who
drafted it were not incompetent in the use of English. It
may alert them also to look into the origins and history
12
of the state's clause.
The Oregon Supreme Court developed its state's privileges and
immunities jurisprudence under such a rubric. In Oregon v. Clark,13 the
court evaluated the appellant's claim under the Oregon Constitution
before considering a federal argument under the Fourteenth
Amendment and noted differences in language and context between its
own privileges and immunities clause and the federal counterpart. 14 The
Oregon provision reads as follows: "No law shall be passed granting to
any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the
same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." 15 In discussing the
historical context of the provision, the court distinguished its provision.
"Antedating the Civil War and the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, its language reflects early egalitarian objections
to favoritism and special privileges for a few rather than the concern of
the Reconstruction Congress about discrimination against disfavored
individuals or groups."' 6 The court then set forth the protections
guaranteed by their privileges and immunities clause.
The clause forbids inequality of privileges or immunities
not available "upon the same terms," first, to any citizen,
and second, to any class of citizens. In other words, it
may be invoked by an individual who demands equality
of treatment with other individuals as well as by one
who demands equal privileges or immunities for a class
17
to which he or she belongs.

12 Linde, supra note 7, at 181-82.
13 630 P.2d 810 (Or. 1981).
14 "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
is
OR. CONsT. art. I, § 20.
16 Clark, 630 P.2d at 814.
17

Id.
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The distinctions drawn by the Oregon Supreme Court illustrate the
importance of textual differences between state and federal provisions
and the historical reasons supporting the differences. Noting these
differences sheds light on the purpose and uniqueness of state
constitutions.
Finally, there are numerous state constitutional provisions without
federal counterparts. Clearly, these provisions require independent
analysis by state judges, for it is these provisions that are most uniquely
tailored to the state and its history. Several states have equal rights and
privacy provisions. 18 Quite obviously, the plethora of unique provisions
run from the momentous to the comically idiosyncratic. 19 I mention two
examples of the former that demonstrate the uniqueness and vitality of
state constitutions: property tax provisions and education guarantees.
California has a long history of referendum and initiative, reflecting
the population's dedication to direct democracy. 20 These initiatives have
regularly risen to constitutional importance, including the famous
Proposition 13 through which the people of California set off an
earthquake in local fiscal matters. "The modem era of direct democracy
in local fiscal decision-making has its origins in [Proposition] 13.
[Proposition] 13 was an extraordinary political event in American history
by any measure, a 'modem Boston Tea Party,' according to the New
21
York Times."

is

The following state constitutions contain an equal rights provision: CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29; CONN. CoNsT. art. I, § 20 (1965, amended 1974); HAW. CONST.
art. I, § 3 (1968, amended 1982); ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 17, 18; LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12; MD.
CONST. art. 46, Declaration of Rights; MASS. CONST. art. VI; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; VA.
CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1 (1889, amended 1972); WYO. CONST. art. I, §
3. See Linde, supra note 7, at 182 n.40.
The following state constitutions contain a privacy provision: ALA. CONST. art. I, § 22;
ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; HAW. CONST. art. I, §
6; ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MisS. CONST. art. III, § 23; MONT. CONST.
art. II, §§ 9, 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. See Linde, supra note 7, at
182 n.41.
19 The New York Constitution provides for the width of ski trails. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV,
§1.
20 Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and Local Fiscal Policy
at the Intersection of Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The Property Tax as a Case in Point,
35 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 511 (2002) (discussing direct democracy's effect on the property
tax movement).
21 Kirk J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 191, 197 (2001) (footnotes
omitted) (citing Robert Lindsey, California Tax Revolt: Lesson for Legislators, N.Y. TIMES, June
12, 1978, at B10).
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The California Supreme Court heard its first constitutional challenge
to Proposition 13 in Amador Valley Joint Union High School Districtv. State
Board of Equalization.22
This challenge was brought against the
constitutional amendment as approved by voters earlier that same year
by Proposition 13, seeming to complicate the traditional constitutional
analysis. The circumstances by which the case was before the court
emphasized the "joie de vivre" of pure state constitutional
jurisprudence. The court stayed the course, however, and stated its
intentions clearly.
We stress initially the limited nature of our inquiry. We
do not consider or weigh the economic or social wisdom
or general propriety of the initiative. Rather, our sole
function is to evaluate article XIII A legally in the light of
established constitutional standards.
We further
emphasize that we examine only those principal,
fundamental challenges to the validity of article XIII A
as a whole. 23
Commensurate with California's active referendum process and in
addition to traditional constitutional analysis, courts also consider
language from official ballot pamphlets, voter intent, and the intent of
ballot framers. 24
California's experience with Proposition 13 certainly garnered many
headlines, but other states have been dealing with property taxes on
their own terms. Several states have experienced extensive litigation
regarding the applicability of their constitutions' uniformity clause to
property assessment schemes. Wisconsin's rich history of cases under its
uniformity clause dates from 1859. 25 More recently, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court applied the same clause to a statute which undervalued
assessments of agricultural land and placed an unequal tax burden on
owners of residential property. 26

22 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
23 Id.at 241.
24 Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (2001);
Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (1994).
25 Knowlton v. Bd. of Supervisors of Rock County, 9 Wis. 410 (1859); see also Jack Stark, A
Comparison of the Wisconsin and Iowa Constitutions,31 RUTGERS L.J. 1019 (2000).
26 Wisconsin ex rel. Boostrom v. Bd. of Review, 166 N.W.2d 184 (Wis. 1969).
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In the Indiana version of this sort of litigation, the Indiana Supreme
Court determined that the existing property wealth assessment system
violated Indiana's Constitution. 27 The court again relied on the history
and text.
By instructing the General Assembly to "provide, by
law, for a uniform and equal rate of property assessment
and taxation" and to "prescribe regulations to secure a
just valuation for taxation of all property," the Property
Taxation Clause requires the creation of a uniform,
equal, and just system. However, the constitutional text
does not expressly provide a personal right of absolute
uniformity and equality in assessment rate. We also
note that this provision is not located in Article I of our
state constitution, which generally protects individual
liberty rights and limits government action.
... [Wihen Article X was under consideration at the
Constitutional Convention of 1850-51, the delegate who
proposed it, Daniel Read, acknowledged the aspirational
nature of the provision's language and implied "that he
did not expect the full achievement of absolute and
precise exactitude." Delegate Read emphasized, "The
rule will be a part of the organic law, and the people and
the Legislature will endeavor to work up to a rule so
28
manifestly just and equitable."
Inescapably intertwined with property tax reform, school finance
makes up the lion's share of state budgets, garners much political debate,
and often requires the attention of the state judiciary. The issue pits state
constitutional guarantees for a free education against local concerns of
property tax rates and the quality of educational services against
constitutional requirements for uniform taxation. As Professor Michael
Heise has written:
School finance reform efforts in this country
frequently involve the courts through litigation or the
threat of litigation.
The scope, approach, and
constitutional basis of such litigation has changed over

27
2

State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d 1034 (Ind. 1998).
Id. at 1040 (citations omitted).
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School finance court decisions

Commentators note three distinct "waves" of school
finance court decisions. The first wave, which focused
on the federal constitution's Equal Protection Clause,
began in 1971 with Serrano v. Priest29 and ended in 1973
with the [United States] Supreme Court's decision in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.30 The
second wave, which concentrated on equal protection
and education clauses found in state constitutions,
began in 1973 with Robinson v. Cahill31 and ended in
1989. The third and current wave of decisions, which
began in 1989, focuses on education clauses in state
constitutions.
Besides its focus on the education clauses of state
constitutions, the most recent wave of school finance
court decisions is distinguished by another important
factor.
Specifically, the third wave illustrates the
replacement of traditional "equity" court decisions with
"adequacy" decisions. 32
Kentucky ushered in the "third wave" of school finance court
decisions in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. 33 Relying heavily
upon comments made by framers of the Kentucky Constitution at the
constitutional debates, the court declared Kentucky's school finance
system unconstitutional under Section 183:
It serves no purpose to further lengthen this opinion
with more verbiage from the Constitutional debates.
Delegates Beckner and Moore told their fellow delegates
and have told us, what this section means.

487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
31
303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
32
Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From
Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1151, 1152-53 (1995) (original footnotes omitted).
33
790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
2

0
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This Court, in defining efficiency must, at least in
part, be guided by these clearly expressed purposes.
The framers of Section 183 emphasized that education is
essential to the welfare of the citizens of the
Commonwealth. By this animus to Section 183, we
recognize that education is a fundamental right in
Kentucky. 34
State courts have greatly enriched a history of state constitutional
jurisprudence in recent decades. While the rapid increase in state
constitutional claims has inevitably led to dramatic development in a
compressed period that sometimes left inadequate time for modest steps,
the results are nevertheless impressive. As state judges warmed to the
idea of developing state constitutional provisions and litigants realized
their importance, bench and bar alike looked for additional sources of
state constitutional claims.
Il1.

CERTIFIED QUESTIONS FROM FEDERAL COURTS

One class of opportunities came in the form of certified questions
from federal courts. It provided a match between state judges exploring
new ways of advancing state constitutional jurisprudence and federal
judges searching for more efficient ways of complying with the mandate
of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.35
In their attempts to determine state substantive law, federal judges
are faced with three basic options: predicting unsettled state law,
declining supplemental jurisdiction over cases with novel or complex
state lawA6 or certifying a question to the state's supreme court for
clarification. 37 After a good deal of experimentation by courts and
extensive discussion among academics, the third of these options has
become a standard procedural tool.
Certification is perhaps uniquely suited to further
the principles of judicial federalism underlying the
Supreme Court's decision in Erie. By allowing state,

Id. at 206. "The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an
efficient system of common schools throughout the State." Ky. CONsT. § 183.
35
304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of
Certification,47 ARK. L. REV. 305 (1994).
36
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2000).
37
IND. App. R. 64.
3
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rather than federal, courts to supply "an authoritative
response" in the very case in which an unsettled
question of state law arises, certification ensures that
states-acting through agents of their choice-rather
than federal courts will exercise the "sovereign
prerogative of choice" inherent in the resolution of
38
unsettled questions of state law.
In a recent survey, federal judges cited to the following benefits of
certification:
"orderly development of law, particularly in diversity
cases"; "result produced is a reliable and controlling
precedent"; "avoidance of needless conflicts on state
law"; "comity"; "allows for judicial economy and cost
saving measures to the litigants"; "will usually help
other state or federal courts with similar case issues";
"uniformity of results and justice"; "reducing risks of
different outcomes depending on forum choice,
reducing forum shopping, quicker resolution by state
court of last resort of issues affecting many pending
decisions in both state and federal courts"; "can avoid
useless wheel-spinning"; and "avoiding conflicts
39
between different panels in the same circuit."
In 1945, the Florida legislature passed the first act permitting a state
supreme court to answer certified questions.4° The statute lay dormant
for fifteen years until the United States Supreme Court revived it by
encouraging the court of appeals to certify two questions to the Florida
Supreme Court for authoritative resolution and offered support for the
process. 41 "The Florida Legislature, with rare foresight, has dealt with
the problem of authoritatively determining unresolved state law
involved in federal litigation by a statute which permits a federal court to
certify such a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme Court of
Florida for its decision." 42 All but three states now have a certification

3
Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459,
1550 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
39

JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW: FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE

53 (1995).
40 1945 Fla. Laws ch. 23098, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1988)).
41 Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
42

Id. at 212.
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process in place. 43 The court rules or statutes governing the process
generally borrow provisions from the Uniform Certification of Questions
of Law Act or adopted it wholesale. In 1995, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws revised the uniform act to
provide more direction to judges and a more orderly process.44
The uniform act centers on two significant sections, which in turn
permit federal courts to certify questions to the highest state court and
authorize the highest state court to answer. In the prefatory note, the
commissioners expressed the uniform act's purpose as follows:
The Uniform Act/Rule provides a relatively simple
means by which federal courts and state appellate courts
can efficiently obtain answers to questions of law from
Where
the highest court of the controlling State.
adopted, it would allow a federal court or state appellate
court, having determined that the law of another State
controls a controversy, to avoid guessing what that law
is when there is no definitive answer in the law of the
Instead, the court would simply
controlling State.
certify the question of law to the highest court of the
45
controlling State.
The power to certify is carefully tempered by sections two and three of
the act.
The [Supreme Court] [or an intermediate appellate
court] of this State, on the motion of a party to pending
litigation or its own motion, may certify a question of
law to the highest court of another State [or of a tribe] ...
if:
(1) the pending litigation involves a question to be
decided under the law of the other jurisdiction;
(2) the answer to the question may be determinative of
an issue in the pending litigation; and
(3) the question is one for which an answer is not
decision,
provided by a controlling appellate

New Jersey, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania do not have a certification process in
place. See Clark, supra note 38.
44
The Act remains in draft form.
43

45

UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 68 (1996).
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other

47
The power to answer language mirrors this section in relevant part.
The uniform act also prescribes the record to be forwarded to the
answering court, 48 and various procedures regarding the certification
49
process.

Predictably, federal judges have been receptive to certifying
questions to state supreme courts. The process not only satisfies their
Erie obligation, but also relieves them of the burden of deciding
important state issues, a burden more readily apparent when the
affected state is not one within the federal judge's circuit. A federal
judge sitting in New York, for example, may find it more difficult to
decide a complicated claim under the Alabama Constitution.
Notwithstanding a few concerns regarding delay and a cautious
approach taken by some state supreme courts, federal judges regularly
employ the process.
IV. EFFECTS OF CERTIFICATION ON STATE COURTS

To be sure, the state courts reap certain advantages from the system
of certification. Most notably for present purposes, a certified question
insures that the state supreme court decides important and often novel
issues of state constitutional law.5 0 Moreover, because certification shortcircuits state appellate procedure and presents questions directly to the
5
state's highest court, it saves time and conserves finite state resources. '
The practice of certification, however, is not always as successful as it is
in theory. The process is sometimes not as efficient as it might be, and

46 d. § 2 (amended 1995), 12 U.L.A. 72 (alterations in original).
47 Id. § 3 (amended 1995), 12 U.L.A. 73. This section permits the answering court to
accept the question if "the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in
the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision,
or statute of this State." Id.
4
A certification order must include: the question of law to be answered, facts relevant
to the question, statement acknowledging that the receiving court may reformulate the
question, and names and addresses of counsel of record and unrepresented parties. Id. § 4

(amended 1995), 12 U.L.A. 74.
49 Id. §§ 5-10 (amended 1995), 12 U.L.A. 74-77.
50 Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified
Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373 (2000).
51 Id.
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crafting a certified question that properly presents the issue in a
workable manner has proven to be difficult on occasion.
Certification allows federal courts to adjudicate
cases presenting unsettled questions of state law in a
manner consistent with both judicial federalism and the
constitutional separation of powers. First, unlike
prediction, certification ensures that agents of the state rather than federal courts-make the policy choices
necessary to resolve unsettled questions of state law.
Second, unlike abstention, which effectively nullifies
federal jurisdiction by ceding all three functions of
adjudication (law declaration, fact identification, and
law application) to state courts, certification allows
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction by at least
permitting them to perform fact identification and law
Although certification leaves law
application.
declaration exclusively to the states, this is precisely
where the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Constitution, as
52
interpreted in Erie, assign this function.
In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,53 the U.S. Supreme Court
chastised the Ninth Circuit for avoiding an opportunity to certify a
question to the Arizona Supreme Court. Justice Ruth Ginsburg stated
that the certification process "allows a federal court faced with a novel
state-law question to put the question directly to the State's highest
court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and increasing the assurance
of gaining an authoritative response." 54 A poll of state justices cited
similar benefits to answering certified questions:
"better decisions"; "greater continuity of decisions";
"efficiency and comity"; "state highest courts may speak
in advance of a mix of trial court and federal court
predictions"; "important tool to stabilize the law";
"bench and bar are assisted by our new opinion";
"expeditious resolution of unsettled questions of state
law"; "avoiding duplication of effort"; helps "federal
courts avoid the embarrassment of a wrong guess on the

52
53
54

Clark, supra note 38, at 1464.
520 U.S. 43 (1997).
Id. at 76.
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development of state law"; "could be of value to state
intermediate appellate court if not used too often";
"state trial courts have guidance in an unsettled area of
the law and not inaccurate precedent from the federal
55
court."
It has only been rather late in the forty-year history of certifications
that these benefits have been reaped in cases in which a federal judge
certified a state constitutional question. 56 In 1988, the Texas Supreme
Court entertained a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. It was the Texas court's first opportunity to answer a
certified question, arriving only three years after a constitutional
amendment provided for the procedure.5 7 In Lucas v. United States,58 the
federal court of appeals in certifying the question determined that there
was no precedent from the Texas Supreme Court on the constitutional
issue:
We are uncertain whether the Texas Supreme Court
would uphold the statute under the Texas Constitution.
Specifically, we find "no controlling precedent in the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Texas." We are
persuaded that we should certify this important
question to the Texas Supreme Court, the final arbiter of
59
this issue, rather than engage in an Erie-type guess.
In a common refrain and according with the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure, 60 the federal court appropriately recognized the
need to avoid certification of unnecessary questions.

GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 39, at 53.
The New York Court of Appeals received thirty-nine requests by May 2000. One case
presented a state constitutional issue, but the question was resolved on statutory grounds.
See Tunick v. Safir, 731 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 2000). The court addressed a takings clause issue
under the state constitution in FederalHome Loan Mortgage Corp. v. New York State Division of
Housing & Community Renewal, 662 N.E.2d 773 (N.Y. 1995), even though the question was
not directly before it. No other requests involved a state constitutional question. See also
Kaye & Weissman, supra note 50, at 373.
57 "The supreme court and the court of criminal appeals have jurisdiction to answer
questions of state law certified from a federal appellate court." TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3-c.
58 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
59 Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1986).
60 TEX. R. APP. P. 58.1.
55
56
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To nourish that cooperative spirit necessary to allow the
newly adopted certification process to achieve its
potential, we are persuaded that we ought not seek the
ruling of the Texas Supreme Court regarding an issue
until we have decided other issues in the case to assure
that the certified issue may be dispositive of the case
before us. That court must dole its limited judicial time
by taking for decision only issues of import that must be
61
decided in a true case or controversy.
The Texas court found that the state limit on medical malpractice
damages violated the Texas Constitution's open courts provision,
stating:
Recently, state courts have not hesitated to look to their
own constitutions to protect individual rights. This
court has been in the mainstream of that movement.
Like the citizens of other states, Texans have adopted
state constitutions to restrict governmental power and
guarantee individual rights. The powers restricted and
the individual rights guaranteed in the present
constitution reflect Texas' values, customs, and
traditions. Our constitution has independent vitality,
and this court has the power and duty to protect the
additional state guaranteed rights of all Texans. By
enforcing our constitution, we provide Texans with their
62
full individual rights and strengthen federalism.
In 1976, the Seventh Circuit certified a question to the Indiana
Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of Indiana's guest
statute. 63 It was an issue of first impression. The Indiana Supreme Court
accepted the question and upheld the statute against a challenge under
the Indiana Constitution. 64 In 1993, the Indiana Supreme Court
answered a certified question from the U.S. District Court for the

Lucas, 807 F.2d at 421. The South Dakota Supreme Court decided a similar issue,
holding that the state cap on medical malpractice damages was unconstitutional under the
substantive due process provision of the state constitution. In re Certification of Questions
of Law from U.S. Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit, 544 N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1996).
62
Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 692.
63
Sidle v. Majors, 341 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. 1976).
64
Id. The statute was challenged under IND. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (open courts and due
course of law) and IND. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (equal privileges and immunities). Id.
61
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Northern District of Indiana, holding that a statute exempting all of a
debtor's funds held for retirement from a bankruptcy action was
unconstitutional. 65 Altogether, the Indiana Supreme Court has received
twenty-four requests for certification, five of which have presented state
66
constitutional issues.
Even though the process is now well established, both federal judges
and state justices have identified impediments to successfully certifying
a question. Federal judges acknowledge delay, inadequate factual
records, incomplete answers, and overreaching answers as problem
areas.67 State justices identify insufficient factual records, inadequate
briefing or oral argument, unresolved factual disputes, abstract and
isolated issues, unclear or poorly formed questions, and a tendency to
certify questions which, even if unresolved, have little impact on the
outcome of the case. 68 These difficulties manifest themselves in actual
cases.
The certified questions before the Iowa Supreme Court in Eley v.
Pizza Hut of America, InC.69 demonstrate why state justices occasionally
decline to answer. The lengthy certification order as submitted to the
Iowa Supreme Court is set out as follows:
1. Does the occupier of a business property to which
the public is invited have a duty to exercise due care to
prevent injury or harm to a person who is not and has
not been on that property from the criminal activities of
third persons on the business property which injures the
person on the adjacent property?
2. Must the specific act that causes the injury
originate on the business premises, or can liability be
established without proof as to the third party's location
when the rock was thrown, if there is evidence that the
rock came from the general vicinity of the business

65 In re Zumbrun, 626 N.E.2d 452, 455 (Ind. 1993).
66 The remaining cases presenting state constitutional issues through certified questions
were: Shook Heavy & Environmental Construction Group v. City of Kokomo, 632 N.E.2d 355
(Ind. 1994); Citizens National Bank of Evansville v. Foster, 668 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. 1996); and
Dague v. PiperAircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981).
68

GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 39, at 55.
Id.

69

500 N.W.2d 61 (Ia. 1993).

67
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premises and evidence that the crowd from which the
rock was thrown had originally come to the area by
reason of the fact that the business premises in question
had become a hang out for the post-Friday night football
game activities of the students?
3. Is there a duty on the part of the operator of a
legitimate business to use due care to prevent harm to
persons not patrons of that business from the criminal
acts of person attracted to the vicinity by that business, if
the operator knows or should know from experience
that such persons are likely to become unruly and
commit criminal acts that could injure persons in the
vicinity but not on the business premises and that the
criminal conduct could be eliminated by reasonable
action on the operator's part?
4. Does the occupier of a business property have a
duty to exercise due care to prevent injury or harm to
persons who are within the zone of danger created by
the criminal conduct of high school students if such
persons have not been on the business property but the
occupier knows or should have known:
(1) of the problems created by high school
students congregating on and near the business
premises after Friday night football games for
several years,
and
(2) of the criminal propensities of the students
including the use of alcohol and the tendency
toward fights and violence,
and
(3) that the problems had been successfully
eliminated in earlier years through the use of an
on-premises security guard?70
The questions as certified necessitated that the Iowa Supreme Court rule
on unsettled common law. Citing to unresolved factual disputes, the
court stated:

70

Id. at 62.
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A request to expand our common law is a reasonable
The problem we have with attempting to
one.
accommodate the parties in this case is that we do not
have the specificity in the facts presented to us that we
would have in the course of a normal appeal to our
71
court.
This sort of hesitation has occurred elsewhere. The Ohio Supreme
Court declined to answer a certified question, stating that "it is not
appropriate for this court to answer certified questions of state law that
are so factually specific in nature." 72
Proponents of certification often tout the process as a timesaving
tool. While at least New York has experienced a short turn-around
time, 73 this is not always the case.7 4 Obstacles to an efficient certification
process are not hard to imagine. State supreme courts have crowded
dockets, and answering certified questions is not yet common enough to
be routine. Certainly, a state supreme court would have little difficulty
in timely answering a question regarding the meaning of a particular
term within a statute. The task becomes more challenging when a
principle of the state constitution is at play. Constitutional issues are
difficult to resolve even when a fully developed and adjudicated case is
before the court. When that same issue is before the court, prompted by
a certified question, some judicial hesitancy is to be expected. In the final
section, I explore how the perceived dangers of certifying state
constitutional questions might affect state constitutional jurisprudence.
V. EFFECTS OF CERTIFICATION ON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

While certification is proclaimed the solution to the federal court's
need to determine state law, its impact on state constitutional
jurisprudence has been largely ignored. Whether certification proves to
be beneficial or detrimental in the end, we must at least explore certain
aspects of the procedure which appear to forecast negative consequences
for our state jurisprudence.

Id. at 63.
Copper v. Buckeye Steel Castings, 621 N.E.2d 396, 396 (Ohio 1993).
73
Kaye & Weissman, supranote 50, at 373.
74
See Honorable Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question .... 29 SUFFOLK
U. L. REv. 677 (1995) (citing cases in which the certification process lasted for more than a
year).
71
72
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There are at least three difficulties with certification that affect the
law-giving function. First, the procedural posture of certified questions
forces a state court's collective hand to answer yes or no on complicated
and often fact-sensitive issues. Second, judges are required to resolve
constitutional issues when the case would be better decided on statutory
grounds.75 Third, the creation of precedent-setting law without a welldeveloped factual background before the state supreme court may very
well undermine and dilute state case law.
A certified question arrives in a state supreme court in two parts:
the question and a set of supporting facts. Either part may turn out to be
problematic. A question can be poorly phrased, lacking in specificity, or
unduly inclusive. Similarly, the facts may be lacking sufficient detail,
disputed, or simply unclear. The uniform act attempts to solve such
inherent difficulties in certification through reformation of the question,
but it falls short of finding the solution.76
As already discussed, the phrasing of the question itself can make
the court's legal analysis more difficult. Compounding the problem is
the snowball effect of answering the poorly phrased question. For
example, in Eley v. Pizza Hut, the question was so factually burdened that
the myriad of legal issues raised were all but lost. If the Iowa Supreme
Court had answered any of these questions, affirmatively or negatively,
the value of such an opinion would have been open to doubt. The
uniform act attempts to address this problem in section four, which
reads as follows: "The [Supreme Court] of this State may reformulate a
question of laws certified to it." 77 Reforming the question sometimes
makes the state court's task more manageable by permitting the justices
to frame legal issues in terms of their own jurisprudence, but it may not
assist the federal court in resolving the controversy before it.
Furthermore, reforming the question in a manner more consistent with
state law or at least in state-specific terminology seems to be one step
further away from the live controversy. Even when state constitutions
do not prevent state courts from issuing advisory opinions, the practice
should be undertaken cautiously.

75 Ind. Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co. v. Indiana, 695 N.E.2d 99 (nd. 1998).
76 Because every state with a certification process has its own version of rules, I use the
uniform act as a point of reference. The uniform act is the most comprehensive and the
most progressive.
77

UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 4 (amended 1995), 12 U.L.A. 74

(1996) (alteration in original); see supranote 48.
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The phrasing of the question is not always the problem. In Tunick v.
Safir, the New York Court of Appeals declined to answer three certified
questions, the third of which challenged the constitutionality of a New
York statute that may have prevented a public photo shoot of nude
models. 78 The court reasoned that:
[Tihe presence of the State constitutional issue-the
third question- explicitly weighed in the balance
The parties themselves,
favoring certification[.]
however, did not raise, brief or argue a State
constitutional issue. This Court could not responsibly
engage on that question where the parties to the
litigation have not sought relief under this State's
Constitution and the issue would be first briefed and
raised in our Court. 79
Although the facts, as presented to the state supreme court, may be
unclear or insufficient, certified questions, in this respect, are no different
than any other case before the court. The true problem arises when the
facts are in dispute. Issuing an opinion based on disputed facts clearly
weakens the decision. This is a common reason for state supreme courts
to decline a question. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine declined to
answer a certified question stating:
If we are to participate and yet not render purely
advisory opinions, we think it will be incumbent upon
us to respond to questions only when it is apparent from
the certification itself that all material facts have been
either agreed upon or found by the court and that the
case is in such posture in all respects that our decision as
to the applicable Maine law will in truth and in fact be
"determinative of the cause" as the statute conferring
80
jurisdiction upon us requires.
The uniform act attempts to address this problem in section six,
which reads in relevant part as follows:

78 731 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 2000); see N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 245.01-245.02 (2000) (Public
Sensibilities Offenses).
79 Tunick, 731 N.E.2d at 599.
so In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 833 (Me. 1966).
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A certification order must contain ...the facts relevant
to the question, showing fully the nature of the
controversy out of which the question arose.... If the
parties cannot agree upon a statement of facts, the
certifying court shall determine the relevant facts and
81
state them as a part of its certification order.
In theory, this section should resolve any factual disputes that might
arise. In practice, however, determining relative facts complicates the
posture of the case. Certainly, a federal district judge would not wish to
be bound by an early determination of the facts, nor would a state
supreme court wish to rule on a hypothetical fact pattern which may be
altered by subsequent proceedings in the federal court. An altered fact
pattern would also weaken an answer given by a state court.
A possible fix for fact-related problems would be accepting
questions from federal appellate courts, 82 because appellate courts rely
on the facts as determined by the district court, making the fact pattern
more certain. This is not a very attractive solution for two reasons. First,
the facts are sometimes subject to differing inferences even on appeal.
Second, the party moving for certification of a question faces an
awkward procedural dilemma. At trial, either the district court will
deny their motion or the state supreme court will decline to answer the
question because the facts are uncertain. If the party waits to move the
appellate court for certification, the appellate panel might suspect forumshopping or purposeful delay and again deny the motion. In response to
a plaintiff moving to certify a question for the first time in the Seventh
Circuit, Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote: "We are not sympathetic to
plaintiffs who opt for a federal forum, lose, and then want a second
83
opinion from a state court."
Certification suffers from more than just procedural flaws. More
fundamental concerns in answering constitutional certified questions
face state courts.
When a certified question squarely places a constitutional issue
before the state supreme court, the normal legal progression of resolving

81
82

UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 6 (amended 1995), 12 U.L.A. 75.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 2003).

83

Stamp v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 908 F.2d 1375, 1379 (7th Cir. 1990).
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issues is bypassed; mainly addressing constitutional issues only when
necessary.
It is long established that "a constitutional question
unnecessary to a determination of the merits should not
This long-standing policy of judicial
be decided."
restraint is necessary to the proper determination of
such important questions. Shortly after the adoption of
the present Indiana Constitution, Judge Stuart wrote for
this Court:
Almost every case that comes here, though
it be barren of any other point, is sure to involve
While courts
a constitutional question....
of
constitutional
cannot shun the discussion
questions when fairly presented, they will not
go out of their way to find such topics. They
will not seek to draw in such weighty matters
collaterally, nor on trivial occasions. It is both
proper and more respectful ... to discuss
constitutional questions only where that is the
very lis mota.
It therefore becomes "the duty of the court not to
enter upon the consideration of a constitutional question
where the court can perceive another ground on which it
may properly rest its decision."84
Upon receipt of a certified question involving a state constitution,
state justices must contemplate at least two preliminary determinations
First, is it
in order to protect state constitutional jurisprudence.
appropriate to resolve the issue under the state constitution? Without
performing this initial inquiry, a state court assumes that the federal
court has evaluated state law and determined that neither statute nor
common law answers the question. Second, does the question as
presented appropriately frame the constitutional issue? Without this
determination, the state supreme court assumes, for example, that a
narrow interpretation will not save a challenged statute. In making such
assumptions, a state supreme court errs in three significant ways: it may

Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Scott, 497 N.E.2d 557, 559 (Ind. 1986) (citations and
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hoover v. Wood, 9 Ind. 286, 286-87 (1857)).
84
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decide a constitutional issue when it is not necessary to the outcome; it
may determine a particular statute to be unconstitutional on its face
when it may only be unconstitutional as applied; and it allows a federal
court to determine the applicable state statutory law. Permitting federal
courts this determination violates both Erie and judicial federalism
principles. We once described such concerns this way:
If this were not a federal question, our analysis would
focus first on potentially dispositive non-constitutional
issues before turning to the constitutionality of the two
statutes' application to the [parties]. Though presented
in a particular factual context, the two questions before
us require facial interpretation only, which not only
prevents our review of otherwise relevant issues, but
demands a sweeping pronouncement of the statutes'
constitutionality regardless of the factual setting.
Application of the law to case-specific facts has always
constitutional
this
Court's
relevant
to
been
jurisprudence, and though our consideration of certified
questions promotes the accurate application of state law
in federal courts, we also acknowledge the shortcomings
85
of such proceedings.
To avoid such pitfalls, an answering court must be willing either to
decline to answer an offending question or to rephrase the question as
presented. As mentioned above, these solutions present their own
problems.
Finally, the lack of a fully developed factual record raises further
problems. 86 The difficulties of answering a poorly supported question
itself are obvious. Less apparent are potential and unintended effects on
the development of state constitutional law. Without the benefit of an
opinion supported by a developed record, the precedential value of a
previously unsettled point of constitutional law becomes uncertain.
Future litigants relying on such an opinion will have a holding to bolster
their position without the benefit of an analysis akin to what we
sometimes call "mixed questions of fact and law."

85

86

Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evansville v. Foster, 668 N.E.2d 1236, 1242 (Ind.1996).
GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 39, at 55.
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Litigation by its very nature rises from facts, often complicated and
ambiguous facts. Rarely, if ever, do courts decide pure questions of law.
Constitutional issues are especially fact sensitive, requiring a litigant to
argue the facts as much as the law. For example, every state constitution
has a takings clause. Both litigants and the court are very familiar with
the clause and the test by which it is applied. It is the regulations, rules,
statutes, and circumstances unique to each case that distinguish each
holding and develop the law. Any procedure that might diminish the
reliability of facts in such cases must be carefully evaluated for potential
repercussions.
VI. CONCLUSION

Inherent attributes of certification indicate that deciding state
constitutional questions in this manner may, at best, temper the
influence of answers and at worse, dilute the quality of state
constitutional case law. In addition to all other factors that state justices
consider when accepting or declining a certified question, I suggest that
they also consider the ability to craft an answer that will not only resolve
the issue, but also contribute positively to the state jurisprudence.
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